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 Some Discussions on Functionalist Housing 
and its Economics in Romania 
by the Late 1950s and Early 1960s 
 
MARA MĂRGINEAN 
(Academia Română/Institutul de Istorie “George Barițiu”, Cluj) 
 
 
 
In November 1958, the Romanian Workers’ Party launched a new 
economic program. After several years of economic stagnation and faltering 
public investments, the communist bosses announced a new approach to 
industrialization. Unlike the early 1950s, when most financial resources were 
directed towards several key industrial sites while social matters were ignored 
altogether, by the late 1950s the political leadership took a slightly different 
path and promised to balance the growth of heavy and light industries. 
Furthermore, several other measures, including raising the employees’ wages, 
cutting some commodities’ prices, and building state-funded dwellings, would 
have made the industrialization effort more bearable for the workers. Such goals 
carried both ideological and strategic connotations. On the one hand, an 
expanding industry would have raised the proletarians’ number, thus 
broadening the social basis for the regime’s legitimacy. On the other hand, 
modernizing Romania in this way, and in a certain sense even against 
Moscow’s will, rendered the conflict with the Soviet Union unavoidable1. 
However, archival evidence unveils that the national party bosses showed little 
concern for the latter issue. On the contrary, as many political statements issued 
at the time flesh out, the country’s leadership was committed to carrying out the 
new industrialization project in its own terms. Nevertheless, the financial 
resources available were limited and hard to get by. In fact, as some party 
members pointed out, expanding industrial infrastructure in tandem with 
improving the living standards loomed itself complicated given that over the 
previous years the country’s economic performance has been scarce2. Adopting 
the new economic path, therefore, opened ample public debates about better 
                                                 
1  On Moscow’s opposition to the Romanian accelerated growth of heavy industry, see 
Liviu C. Ţârău, Între Washington şi Moscova. România 1945-1965, Editura Tribuna, Cluj 
Napoca, 2005, pp. 455-456.  
2  Michael Montias, Economic Development in Communist Romania, MIT Press, Cambridge 
Mass, 1967, pp. 188-193. 
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financial practices. It also questioned how bureaucratic structures could relate 
more efficiently to expert knowledge. For example, decision-making factors 
argued that increasing the number of state-owned apartments was unobtainable 
unless lowering the building costs. Soon after, architects and politicians 
resumed older discussions about blueprints’ standardization, large-scale use of 
prefabricated components, building costs, or industrialization at large
3
. Held 
either behind closed doors over long professional and political meetings, or in 
the open within the pages of the national press, such discussions brought to the 
fore functionalist architecture as a cheap alternative to overly decorative 
Socialist Realism.  
I propose to examine this shift from Socialist Realism to functionalist 
architecture that occurred in Romania by the late 1950s and early 1960s by 
considering the making of the new aesthetics in close connection with the 
availability of financial resources. So far, scholars of the communist regime 
have mostly investigated issues related to political repression, collectivization or 
propaganda, while social and economic aspects remained under-researched. The 
few works completed on the population’s living standard stressed either the 
1980s daily shortages
4
 or the implications of Nicolae Ceaușescu’s pro-life 
policy
5
. Architects highlighted their precarious professional status during those 
years and showed little interest in how apartment blocks turned themselves into 
“actors” on the Romanian political scene6. In this respect, questions about a 
possible nexus between mass housing’s aesthetics and attempts to overcome 
economic limitations remain unaddressed. How could the cost of housing 
influence the dynamics of national economic policies? Why is housing relevant 
in articulating a national agenda? To what extent could architectural design 
contribute to the (re)making of a national prestige within and beyond the 
socialist bloc? Such questions, nevertheless, need a closer look at the context in 
which this shift occurred – that is taking a trans-national approach to 
architectural aesthetics.  
I premise that discussions on simplicity in architectural design were far 
from a Romanian affair. By the mid-1950s, the Soviet party boss Nikita 
                                                 
3  “Economic Aspects of Gheorghiu -Dej Report to November Plenum 
Analyzed”,  4 December 1958. HU OSA 300-8-3-5345, p. 1, http://hdl.handle.net/10891/ 
osa:abadc2c3-4862-456f-a2a8-1f43c95f00a8 (accessed on 30 January 2017). 
4  Adrian Neculau (ed.), Viaţa cotidiană în comunism, Iaşi, Polirom, 2004; Ruxandra Ivan 
(ed.), “Transformarea socialistă”. Politici ale regimului comunist între ideologie și 
administrație, Polirom, Iași, 2009.  
5  Corina Doboș (ed.), Politica pronatalistă a regimului Ceaușescu (vol. I): O perspectivă 
comparativă, Polirom, Iași, 2010; Luciana M. Jinga (ed.), Politica pronatalistă a 
regimului Ceaușescu (vol. 2): Instituții și practici, Polirom, Iași, 2011.  
6  See Ana Maria Zahariade, Arhitectura în proiectul comunist. România 1944-1989, 
Simetria, Bucureşti, 2011; Miruna Stroe, Locuirea între proiect şi decizie politică. 
România 1954-1966, Simetria, Bucureşti, 2011.  
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Khrushchev argued that the best way to streamline the building industry would 
be a sober use of modernist principles by the socialist architecture
7
. While 
modernism has always been tied to mass housing projects, what is particular 
about Romania’s case is the ambiguous context when modernism became a 
state policy. The national authorities resumed cultural and economic 
collaboration with the West in the mid-1950s. On the long-term, Romania 
benefited from this détente, even though the Soviets themselves endorsed and 
encouraged the dialogue across the Iron Curtin as part of a pragmatic agenda of 
securing up-to-date technology for the socialist countries. Architects extended 
contacts with their Western colleagues, a collaboration that greatly improved 
the national housing design; they also grew increasingly aware of the economic 
programs’ social stakes. While this happened in other socialist countries too, 
Romania saw in industrialization and price efficiency a steady drive towards 
“independence” from the USSR, which delineates the national modernist 
architecture as a byproduct of entangled influences of economic policies, 
national agenda, the Soviets’ constraints, scarcity, and opening to the West. 
From the Romanian authorities’ point of view, therefore, increasing the mass 
housing’s profitability could save important financial resources for other 
investments in heavy industry, while maintaining the appearance of a social 
state. Similarities between Soviet and Romanian modernist building projects 
suggested a coherent approach to housing throughout the bloc. However, this 
article will show that functionalist architectural modernism ‒ cheap and fast to 
erect ‒ also proved beneficial for Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej’s economic plans, 
which questions urban construction projects’ political agendas and the 
professional tensions between architects and economists. Therefore, 
investigating the functionalist architecture opens up several lines of inquiry. To 
what extent was Nikita Khrushchev’s housing program transferred to Romania? 
How can we analyze the tortuous policies of the Romanian state’s leadership in 
the field of housing? How did local bureaucratic or professional actors 
appropriate, interpret and adjust such programs? What were the economic costs 
of the new functionalist approach to urban dwelling? In this way, this article 
reads the making of functionalist mass housing programs in the late 1950s to 
assess the Soviets’ part in building the Romanian cities. To this end, the article 
contributes to the recent scholarly literature on multiple modernities
8
.  
                                                 
7  Mark B. Smith, “Khrushchev’s Promise to Eliminate the Urban Housing Shortage. Rights, 
Rationality and the Communist Future”, in Melanie Ilic, Jeremy Smith (eds.), Soviet State 
and Society under Nikita Khrushchev, Routledge, London & New York, 2009, pp. 26-28; 
R.W. Davis, Melanie Ilic, „From Khrushchev (1935-6) to Khrushchev (1956-64): 
Construction Policy Compared”, in Melanie Ilic, Jeremy Smith (eds.), Khrushchev in the 
Kremlin: Policy and Government in the Soviet Union, 1953-1964, Routlege, London, 
2011, pp. 206-207.  
8  For a classic reading, see S.N. Eisenstadt, “Multiple Modernities”, Daedalus, vol. 129, no. 1, 
Winter, 2000, pp. 1-29.  
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 “Reading” Architectural Form 
 
In what follows, I propose a methodological framework that uses 
archival documents to unveil the decision-making factor’s part in shaping 
aesthetic projects. My main goal here is to reinterpret a corpus of archival 
documents, which historiography usually reads through the totalitarianism’s lens, by 
considering the complex interactions occurred between individual and institutional 
actors. I argue that turning modernist architecture into a state policy was a 
“process” rather than an outcome of some inflexible decisions taken by diverse 
power structures
9
.  
Recently, Stephen Kotkin remarked: “Behind closed doors, [party 
leaders] spoke the same way to each other when nobody else was listening as 
they spoke in the public propaganda […] behind closed doors, communists were 
communists”. While introducing his latest book, Kotkin made a case for the 
archival documents’ scrupulous reading and argued that researchers should 
equally consider the empirical information itself and its putting into words. 
Looking at their language could aid comprehending the actors’ perspective, as 
their phrasing of ideas or opinions unveiled not only a discursive routine but a 
particular way of appropriating ideology and official regulations too. Thus, he 
pointed out how a way of speaking about politics could unveil more information 
on “power, where it comes from and in what ways and with what consequences 
it is exercised.”10. Such observation is particularly important here since the story 
of Romanian modernist mass housing programs fleshed out an aesthetic product 
shaped by different spoken “languages”. Although the aesthetic concept came 
from the Soviets’ headquarters, its making was not written by them. Instead, 
individuals’ engagement, their ideological literacy or divergent interests had a 
saying in how the project ultimately looked. This was the case for both 
politicians and architects. However, the involvement of professionals and 
decision-making factors did not occur along the same paths. Over the years, 
local architects blended professional values, university education, various 
international aesthetic influences, and political views. Therefore, the outcome of 
their work was hardly predictable; they often employed randomly elements 
taken from the national tradition, Western modernism and Soviet models, while 
the final product provided numerous instances of “original” adaptations of the 
role models. Furthermore, politicians related to the mass housing programs 
more to address social unrest than as an aesthetic agenda, and adjusted their 
actions under domestic and international circumstances. Actors were both 
enabled and controlled by their professional priorities, their visibility within the 
                                                 
9  For examples in other socialist countries, see Kimberly Elman Zarecor, Manufacturing a 
Socialist Modernity. Housing in Czechoslovakia, 1945-1960, University of Pittsburg 
Press, Pittsburg, 2011, pp. 5 and 118. 
10  Stephen Kotkin, Stalin: Paradoxes of Power, 1878-1928, Penguin Books, New York, 
2015, p. 1.  
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state, the bureaucratic functioning, and financial resources. Most of the time, 
they acted according to their status, which echoed local or national particular 
circumstances that adjusted the Soviet role model in many, sometimes even 
conflicting ways. Researchers should question the actors’ familiarity with the 
ideological precepts, decide how those involved in housing projects “talked” 
about the building project, and if their “language” adjusted the aesthetic line in 
any way. One should read the document’s structure through the eyes of those 
“present” there and corroborate such information with various phrasings used in 
the national and local newspapers.  
Several categories of sources are useful here: transcripts of the 
governmental meetings, discussions between local leaders, documents resulting 
from the professional get-togethers, bureaucratic regulations, financial reports, 
and statistical data compiled under various circumstances. These sources unveil 
a myriad of discursive forms. The documents’ content shows that those 
responsible with housing programs shared varying degrees of familiarity with 
the communist ideology, while their choices were the result of professional, 
bureaucratic and financial limitations, but also of their distance from the party’s 
decision center. The documents can reveal a multitude ways of “speaking”, 
depending on the decision-making’s place in the party hierarchy or the 
administrative apparatus of the state, an issue particularly important during the 
formative years of socialism. On the one hand, the language used by Politburo 
or by the Council of Minister’s politicians employed quite often ideological 
constructs. For a while, these leaders often looked up at the Soviet model and 
tried to apply it; some of them even claimed that this was the proper way to 
improve the Romanians’ living standards. However, already in the early 1950s, 
several politicians argued that the regime should consider an alternative path in 
domestic affairs, which laid the premises for the incoming breakthrough in the 
socialist bloc’s unity. On the other hand, however, the regional secretaries and 
other local officials shared a genuine concern for practical aspects. The 
semantic value of the Soviet influence loomed itself diluted at the local level, 
while the population’s practices weighted more than some abstract theoretical 
constructs. In reading the building project and handling the aesthetic route, local 
actors rarely referred to ideological canons and stated, instead, concerns for 
financial resources, bureaucratic limitations or social unrests. To this end, I 
propose to investigate the structural changes in the making of aesthetic line by 
an alternative reading of the functionalist housing projects. 
 
 
 Does Form Matter? 
 Socialist Realism as Waste of State’s Recourses 
 
Unlike other countries in the Eastern Bloc, in Romania, Socialist 
Realism was institutionalized relatively late. Until November 1952, when the 
State Committee for Architecture and Construction was established, the party 
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bosses showed little concern for the building field. In the years that followed 
after the regime’s change in December 1947, the communists’ priorities 
revolved around the development of heavy industry, while the party’s unity was 
shattered by never-ending internal struggles. It should not come as a surprise 
that under these circumstances housing programs ranked low on the official 
agenda. However, in the early 1950s, some social unrest forced the regime into 
reconsidering public investments, particularly in terms of spending for the 
dwellings’ building. Beyond such pragmatic concerns, housing programs 
carried multiple ideological connotations. The way buildings looked was a 
political statement as much as an aesthetic one. In other words, since Romania 
aspired to fully integrating herself into the socialist bloc, the national 
architecture should have followed the same conceptual paths as in other East 
European countries. Yet, the buildings completed until 1952 displayed a 
fragmented use of the standard socialist realist constructs. In this respect, 
institutionalizing the new aesthetics called for some serious reevaluations of 
professional practices. 
Moreover, some evidence suggests that the Soviet officials played an 
important part in these events. In June 1952, governmental officials mounted a 
Romanian architecture exhibition in Moscow. At that moment, they claimed 
that the exhibits would have provided a good opportunity to tell the Kremlin 
bosses about the national building projects completed in the country since 1948. 
However, the show had an unexpected outcome. Behind closed doors, the 
Soviet officials informed the Romanian delegates that their interpretation of the 
official cannon was flawed; a common mistake identified by the Soviets 
consisted of an improper use of the national tradition by the socialist realist 
style. Moreover, although the new buildings would have served as “palaces for 
the working people”, a large part of the Romanian achievements displayed an 
artificial combination of decorative neo-classical elements that carried no 
ideological meaning
11
. These events had important consequences in Bucharest. 
Upon their return home, the Romanian officials have acknowledged that despite 
their efforts, the architectural style still had to align itself to the socialist realist 
canon “national in form and socialist in content”. In November 1952, the 
Council of Ministers adopted several legislative measures to line up a local 
practice to the “older brother’s” regulations; the national authorities created new 
institutions and sketched ambitious urban projects
12
. 
Over the following few years, the Romanians proved unsuccessful to 
completing large scale socialist-realist architectural projects. Between 1952 and 
1954, the national authorities erected several housing estates in Bucharest, the 
Jiu Valley and Hunedoara. However, Socialist Realism had only a limited 
impact on the Romanian-built environment. Shortly after the November 1952 
                                                 
11  ANIC, Fond Consiliul de Miniştri, file 88/1951, p. 2; Fond Stenograme birouri pe ramuri, 
file 6/1952, pp. 14-17; M. Rzianin, „Arhitectura Republicii Populare Române”, 
Contemporanul, 29 August 1952, p. 3. 
12  ANIC, Fond Consiliul de Miniştri, file 53/1953, p. 1. 
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governmental regulations, the Soviet adviser A.I. Zvezdin put some pressure on 
the Romanian institutional machinery to ensure that local practices would 
comply with the role models of Socialist Realism. In early 1953, he inspected 
the main building sites and unveiled many problems. Moreover, Zvezdin 
addressed aesthetic aspects, while the housing’s poor quality or the general 
mess on the building sites remained mostly unmentioned. His critical report 
landed on the State Planning Committee’s table just weeks after his on-site 
visits and demanded immediate actions. However, the Romanian governmental 
officials showed little concern for the Soviet adviser’s demands. The national 
authorities’ hesitation for bringing Socialist Realism to life had two causes. 
First, the urban labor force, for which the state arguably would have built those 
“palaces for the working people”, seemed rather insensible to neoclassical 
decorations; instead, industrial employees saved no effort to state their 
dissatisfaction with the poor quality of the apartments’ interior finishes. Second, 
the Romanian authorities did not have sufficient money to complete the planned 
housing projects. The amounts available, few and poorly managed, could hardly 
cover investments in heavy industry’s infrastructure, while the communist 
leaders postponed periodically many of the social projects planned
13
.  
Despite the Soviet advisers’ case for a correct aesthetic practice, 
members of the Romanian government unveiled how such heavily adorned 
buildings were too expensive for the country’s economic possibilities. For 
instance, Miron Constantinescu, the head of the State Planning Committee, 
argued that instead of paying too much attention to the buildings’ aesthetic, the 
authorities should cut the cost price, motivate the builders, and diminish the 
theft of the construction materials. Furthermore, in 1953, Constantinescu 
pointed out towards the chronic waste of raw materials and demanded 
immediate actions to improve the builders’ yield. One of the recurring themes at 
that time consisted of finding a solution to cut irregular expenditure, which 
could be achieved through a more judicious approach to the buildings’ 
decorative features. Moreover, Constantinescu proposed to prioritize the 
Romanian localities according to their economic importance, so that the little 
financial resources available would be spent to ensuring a minimum everyday 
comfort in the most important areas of the country. 
 
 
 The Mid-1950s 
 
As Romania’s economy did not improve after Stalin’s death, the regime 
faced difficulties to complete mass housing programs. By the mid-1950s, the 
authorities abandoned public investments and used the little financial resources 
                                                 
13  ANIC, Fond CC al PCR, Secţia Cancelarie, file 102/1952, p. 2; Fond Consiliul de 
Miniştri, file 50/1953, pp. 2-3; Fond Consiliul de Miniştri-Stenograme, file 9/1953, 
pp. 136-137. 
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available for projects that could ease the social unrest fueled by the low living 
standards. This choice was a consequence of the recent outbursts in Hungary 
and Poland but also of the domestic blockages; the political leaders became 
increasingly aware that, unless they reconsidered the national economic drive, 
the country was in danger of destabilization. While politicians were still trying 
to consolidate their power positions within the state, external evolutions 
impacted directly upon the architectural design. Just months after Stalin’s death 
in 1953, Socialist Realism came under political evaluation. The new simplicity 
that made its way into the official designs seemed rather an outcome of the 
widespread scarcity than of a re-engagement with inter-war modernism. To this 
end, aesthetics loomed itself again as a political project with strong 
ramifications in the Soviet Union. Nikita Khrushchev’s speech held on 
December 7, 1954, at a meeting of the Soviet Architects, announced some 
major structural changes in the building industry. Despite the Soviet leader’s 
open criticism against the main artisans of Socialist Realism, and not against the 
style itself, his speech built on the idea that distancing from the decorative 
excesses of the Stalinist aesthetics and embracing functionalism instead would 
improve the building industry’s efficiency. However, these changes were hard 
to get by as over the next years Nikita Khrushchev fought to consolidate his 
position at the top of the CPUS, which pushed social projects somewhat on the 
side
14
. 
In 1957, just months after his appointment as general secretary, 
Khrushchev announced that in ten years each family would receive access to an 
individual dwelling built from the state’s funds. Researchers have recently 
pointed out the un-realist side of these goals; then, neither the Soviet Union nor 
the East-European socialist states had the technology or the industrial 
infrastructure to carry over such an ambitious project
15
. However, Khrushchev’s 
promise functioned as a turning point in later approaches to mass-housing. 
Shortly after, the Soviet architects designed the blueprints for a new dwelling: 
the 24 square meters two-room apartment that would accommodate a family of 
three. Purely economical in scope, the project carried no ideological stakes. 
Nevertheless, the new political regulations afforded architects a good 
opportunity to reconsider ideas traditionally linked to Western modernism. 
After 1957, the professional language frequently used modernist concepts such 
as “rational intervention”, “public integration”, “architectural determinism”, 
“public participation”, or “centralized development versus regional and urban 
                                                 
14  Catherine Cooke, Susan E. Reid, “Modernity and Realism: Architectural Relations in the 
Cold War”, Rosalind P. Blakesley, Susan E. Reid (eds.), Russian Art and the West. A 
Century of Dialogue in Painting, Architecture, and the Decorative Arts, Northern Illinois 
University Press, DeKalb, IL, 2007, pp. 172-194. 
15  Mark Landsman, Dictatorship and Demand: the Politics of Consumerism in East 
Germany, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. & London, 2005, pp. 173-179.  
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systematization”. In June 1958, Moscow hosted the International Congress of 
Architecture, a professional gathering that showed that the problems faced by 
the architects from both sides of the Iron Curtain were, in many respects, similar
16
. 
From that moment on, the official professional language employed by Eastern 
European architects delineated a complex, yet highly selective, way of defining 
socialist modernity by permanent references to non-socialist design practices. 
In Romania, the political program adopted in November 1958 employed 
many newly developed Soviet ideas about mass housing. In a speech held 
before the party delegates, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej virulently criticized how 
some local bureaucratic structures handled the housing shortage. He voiced his 
dissatisfaction about the overly expensive apartment blocks erected in several 
important industrial centers of the country ‒ the Jiu Valley and Hunedoara ‒ 
where the dwelling space had been particularly scarce. Gheorghiu-Dej also 
pointed out towards the messy building sites, the uncommon high frequency of 
thefts and the high percentage of unskilled builders, which would have further 
worsened the situation. The solution seemed simple, yet radical. The political 
leadership assigned the architects the task to come up with a brand new 
dwelling type that would meet both the requirements of the workers’ families 
and the party’s expectations. After completing several on-site sociological 
surveys, the Romanian authorities argued that a 24 square meters two-room 
apartment would best accommodate a family of three. Furthermore, the 
authorities also pointed to a value of 40.000 lei as the optimum construction 
price, which was half of the average building price of a two-room apartment 
practiced in Romania at the time
17
. 
 
 
 A Soviet Model? 
 
A glance of how modernist architecture resurfaced on the political 
agenda in 1958 may suggest that approaches to mass housing were similar 
throughout the socialist bloc. Turning modernism into a state policy involved a 
better comprehension of the population’s daily needs as well as a systematic 
reorganization of the building industry. At the time, Romania was facing a 
severe housing shortage. Despite the official regulations that guaranteed each 
                                                 
16  “Congresul al V-lea al UIA”, Arhitectura RPR, no. 7, 1958, pp. 16-20 and no. 10-11, 
1958, pp. 61-66. 
17  Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, Expunere făcută la şedinţa plenară a CC al PMR din 26-28 
noiembrie 1958, Editura Politică, Bucureşti, 1958, p. 14; “Un măreţ program de 
activitate”, Arhitectura RPR, no. 10-11, 1958, p. 4; “Extras din expunerea făcută de 
tovarăşul Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej la şedinţa plenară a CC al PMR din 26-28 noiembrie 
1958”, Arhitectura RPR, no. 10-11, 1958, p. 6-7; A. Lupescu, “Analiza economică a 
construcţiilor de locuinţe”, Arhitectura RPR, no. 10-11, 1958, pp. 22-23. 
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person a minimum of eight square meters living space, there were many 
locations in the country where the available dwelling space hardly reached an 
average value of four square meters. Shortly, architects and engineers joined 
their efforts to improve the building technology and raise the number of 
finished apartments. Specialists traveled extensively abroad and aimed to find 
the best way to accommodate functionalist concepts to socialist architecture. To 
some extent, this effort paid off. Press articles announced impressive 
achievements over the subsequent years; accordingly, the number of finished 
apartments would have risen to several hundred thousand, while the living 
standard also improved. 
Nevertheless, beyond these professional efforts, the building process 
rallied various “voices”, which often nourished conflicting comprehensions of 
the functionalist architecture’s political and social relevance. Gheorghe 
Gheorghiu-Dej’s demands for improving the building industry had many 
common features with Khrushchev’s, who had arguably stated that “the 
architect must become an artist who thinks at cost price”18. However, the two 
political leaders did not necessarily share identical views on constructive 
practices, much less on the function of urban space within the national 
economic and social systems. The Soviet leader’s fascination with modernist 
architecture went back many years. In the late 1930s, Khrushchev had tried to 
convince the Soviet authorities about the benefits of a rational approach to 
building industry but Stalin received his suggestions with disdain. He had to 
secure full control over the state before succeeding in reforming the building 
sector. For the Romanian leader, on the other hand, aesthetic aspects featured 
rather irrelevant. Neither in 1958 nor on any other occasion has Gheorghiu-Dej 
verbalized an opinion regarding an acceptable correct aspect of the housing 
estates. Gheorghiu-Dej’s plea for lowering the building costs dwelled on 
pragmatic arguments, and any reference to a modern architecture should not be 
divorced from the events occurred around the Party’s plenary meeting in 
November 1958, nor from its political stakes. 
While a large part of the debates revolved around the building industry, 
the RWP’s plenary meeting announced additional economic reforms, as well. 
Other Eastern European countries opted for consumer industry, and promised 
firm, sometimes even unrealistic policies to improve the population’s living 
standards. The Romanian government, on the other hand, has planned a further 
growth of heavy industry, which called for a “social contract” between workers 
and the regime. As Linda Cooke has recently pointed out, adjusting the 
economic policies under the socialist economies’ increasing exposure to the 
                                                 
18  “Cuvântarea Tovarăşului N. Hruşciov la Consfătuirea Unională pentru Construcţii,  
12 aprilie 1958”, SJAN Hunedoara, Fond PCR ‒ Judeţul Hunedoara, file 3/1958, pp. 76-
103. See also R.W. Davies, Soviet Economic Development from Lenin to Khrushchev, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998, p. 78.  
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international markets had turned workers irreplaceable
19
. The regime needed 
their productive capacity, and, to attain it, was willing to concessions. Gheorghe 
Gheorghiu-Dej claimed that within a few years each family would be sheltered 
into a newly built apartment. Thus, the Romanian authorities found in the 
Soviet housing program – reducing costs, rationalizing the living space, 
functionalism, minimal housing for nuclear families – a valid model for an 
efficient management of financial resources. Industrialization could resume 
only if combined with social programs but doing mass housing in a modernist 
way would have provided significantly more resources for the industrial 
projects themselves. The Romanian leadership combined these sophisticated 
social programs with a nationalist rhetoric. 
The new approach to the built space unveiled how tensed institutional 
interactions occurred on various levels of authority. Behind closed doors, 
housing programs were rarely evaluated by their aesthetic value. In fact, despite 
the political readers’ full responsibility in the decision-making process, 
completing housing programs depended on a number of bureaucrats who often 
read the regulations fragmentarily. For example, shortly after the party meeting 
in November 1958, governmental authorities resumed the institutional dialogue 
between the Bucharest headquarters and the local administrators. The Ministry 
of Construction and the State Planning Committee appointed several high 
functionaries to evaluate the local building programs and to assess the local 
management’s responsibility. Checks carried out on this occasion revealed cases 
of theft and waste of materials, but also many conflicts between the local 
leaders. In Hunedoara, an industrial center located at a considerable distance 
from Bucharest, Gheorghe Hossu, the Minister for the Construction Works, was 
received with a certain hostility. To some point, the local functionaries admitted 
the allegations launched against them in November 1958 and stated that the 
building costs should be cut by half. Indeed, on many sites work stagnated, 
while wastage and high labor fluctuation raised the final price to enormous 
values. However, the Hunedoara bureaucrats criticized the central leadership for 
the discretionary management of financial resources through the centralized 
economic system. Both party members and bosses of the Hunedoara Steel 
Works, the industrial venture in the city, saved no effort to unveil their 
dissatisfaction over the lack of dialogue between state institutions. They also 
pointed out that the final price of housing would have risen because of 
inconsistencies between the plan’s provisions and the availability of builders20.  
                                                 
19  On social contract see Linda J. Cook, The Soviet Social Contract and Why It Failed. 
Welfare Policy and Workers’ Politics from Brezhnev to Yeltsin, Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge MA, 1993. 
20  On a detailed discussion of these events see Mara Mărginean, Ferestre spre furnalul roșu. 
Urbanism și cotidian în Hunedoara și Călan, Polirom, Iași, 2015, pp. 146-157.  
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The local authorities’ frustration, voiced in their dialogue with the 
Bucharest leaders, meant that the latest had enjoyed a certain amount of 
responsibility in handling the building project, which questions the aesthetic 
matters in terms of bureaucratic involvement. Moreover, the local leaders hardly 
made any evaluation of the housing projects beyond the building project itself. 
Minutes of the meetings held in Hunedoara unveiled a long array on prices, 
building figures, employees’ wages, resources etc. Even the housing blueprints 
designed by the State Committee for Architecture and Constructions in 
Bucharest were analyzed in terms of cost efficiency. Furthermore, it happened 
more than once that the local bureaucrats challenged the building projects 
designed in Bucharest as inappropriate for sheltering the local workers and 
pressured the central political authorities to reconsider the dwellings’ typology.  
In fact, architects were little involved in the building process once the 
blueprint design phase was completed. The professional discourse revolved 
around how the newly built urban spaces would integrate local or regional 
specificity into the Romanian cities by a proper capitalization of local materials 
in tandem with a large scale use of prefabricated technologies and standardized 
projects. Their agenda was fully modernist in content, favoring a fresh reading 
of architectural design by numerous references to the Western practices. The 
texts published by Arhitectura RPR, the official magazine of the Architects’ 
Union, contained no reference to the messy realities on the country’s building 
sites. On the contrary, the texts appear tailored after different frameworks than 
the state’s official agenda. In this respect, discussions about modernist 
architecture sketch an alternative perspective that places the Soviet Union 
ambiguously both as the main promoter of change in the Socialist Bloc and as a 
marginal element in the articulation of an independent national agenda.  
 
 
 Conclusion 
 
Was modernist architecture part of a complex process of emancipation 
or a way to learn to speak a particular type of “socialism”? This article premised 
that similarities between East and West in architectural design made possible 
the alignment of East European and Western practices, a complicated process 
initially supported by the Soviets. But the particular manifestations coagulated 
in Romania unveiled an emancipator agenda that ignored the aesthetic 
dimension of architecture in favor of its economic potential. The profitability of 
investing in housing ‒ functionalism and mass construction ‒ was an expression 
of the political concern to industrial growth. In other words, the context of 
modernism’ recovery served the pragmatic policies of Gheorghe Gheorghiu-
Dej, which would become apparent in the early 1960s. 
